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SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE THE COMPLETION
OF DISCOVERY: A PROPOSED REVISION OF
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56(F)
John F. Lapham*
In 1986, the Supreme Court handed down a trio of opinions
that significantly altered the playing field of summary judg-
ment adjudication in the federal courts.' In short, the Court
reduced the moving party's burden and made it possible for
defendants to challenge the factual sufficiency of plaintiffs'
claims without introducing any affirmative evidence of their
own.' In response to a deluge of summary judgment motions,
plaintiffs with insufficient evidence to support their claims
have increasingly 3 sought the protection of rule 56(f) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides trial judges
with discretionary authority to grant continuances of summary
judgment motions for further discovery.4 As a result, a rule
* Article Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Volume 24,
1991. A.B., University of Detroit, 1986; M.A., Purdue University, 1988; J.D.,
University of Michigan Law School, expected 1991.
1. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. (In re
Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation), rev'd, 475 U.S. 574 (1986); see infra notes
41-70 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
3. A Westlaw search ("Rule/1 56(f) & DA(19XX)") conducted on March 22, 1991
in the "ALLFEDS" directory for cases mentioning rule 56(f) revealed the following
trend:










Although this data reflects only the small percentage of cases in which rule 56(f)
has been mentioned in an opinion published on Westlaw, it at least suggests an
increase in the use of this rule since the Supreme Court's opinions in 1986.
4. FED. R. CIv. P. 56(f) provides:
When Affidavits are Unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of
a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present
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that once was rarely used now has become the subject of
substantial litigation.
In its current form, rule 56(f) provides little guidance as to
what a party must show to obtain a continuance.5 The judge
is granted wide discretion. The rule provides simply that
where a party opposing a summary judgment motion shows by
affidavit that she is unable to present facts essential to the
party's opposition, the judge may deny the motion at that time
or grant a continuance for further discovery.6 As a result,
lower courts have applied rule 56(f) inconsistently and
generally have granted continuances if they believed further
discovery would be fruitful.7
This application of rule 56(f) has undermined the basic
purpose of the summary judgment procedure. By failing to
place any limits on judicial discretion, the rule has failed to
assure that factually groundless claims are disposed of as
by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may
refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or
may make such other order as is just.
5. In June 1989, the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference of the United States issued a "Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure." See 110 S. Ct. LIX, LXXX (1989). Among its proposed amend-
ments, the committee suggested a major rewriting of rule 56. Id. at LXXXV. One of
the express purposes of this revision is to "assure a party opposing summary action
of reasonable opportunity for discovery." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) (proposed June 12,
1989), advisory committee notes, reprinted in 110 S. Ct. at CXCIX. To achieve this
purpose, the committee proposed that the following language replace current rule
56(f): "Opportunity for Discovery. No summary judgment shall be rendered with
respect to any claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim, nor shall any
fact be summarily established, until any opposing parties have had a reasonable time
to discover evidence bearing on any fact sought to be established." Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(d) (proposed June 12, 1989), reprinted in 110 S. Ct. at CXCIX.
The committee concluded correctly that rule 56 as it stands does not guarantee
parties an adequate opportunity for discovery, because the current rule gives
"discretion to the district court to grant a continuance to a party opposing summary
judgment when pertinent affidavits or evidence [are] not yet available." Id., advisory
committee notes, reprinted in 110 S. Ct. at CCVII. Though the proposed amendment
will alleviate some uncertainty from the current rule by limiting "the discretion of the
district court to withhold the opportunity for discovery," id., it fails to provide district
courts with any guidance about what a party must show to prove that it has not had
'a reasonable time to discover evidence bearing on any fact sought to be established."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) (proposed June 12, 1989), reprinted in 110 S. Ct. at CXCIX.
Indeed, if anything, the proposed rule will allow courts to be too permissive of further
discovery because it requires courts to allow a reasonable time for discovery but
grants them discretion in determining when a reasonable time has elapsed.
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(f).
7. See infra Part II.
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efficiently as justice will allow. In effect, it has given plain-
tiffs a shield to protect frivolous claims from early dismissals,
thus allowing them to use the threat of discovery as a bargain-
ing chip for a favorable settlement. Rather than allowing the
efficient disposition of factually baseless claims, rule 56(f) has
provided plaintiffs with a screen behind which they can hide
such claims.
This Note proposes that rule 56(f) be tightened to facilitate
the use of summary judgment motions to challenge the factual
sufficiency of claims before and throughout discovery. The rule
it proposes would require plaintiffs to present some factual
support for their claims and to show that discovery is reason-
ably likely to raise a genuine issue of material fact. At the
same time, it would require courts to grant continuances to
plaintiffs who can make these showings.
Part I of this Note discusses the purpose of summary
judgment in a regime of notice pleading. Part II examines
how the federal courts have interpreted and applied rule 56(f).
Part III suggests that rule 56(f) be modified to require a more
significant factual showing before a court may grant a continu-
ance for further discovery. In addition, Part III examines the
policy considerations that support a more stringent rule.
Finally, Part IV provides a hypothetical example illustrating
the benefits of this proposal.
I. THE PURPOSE OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN A
REGIME OF NOTICE PLEADING
A. The Origins of Notice Pleading
Before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(the "Federal Rules") and its state equivalents, pleading was
governed by a series of arcane rules and stylized forms.'
Courts dismissed the claims of parties who did not comply
with these rules, regardless of the claims' underlying merits.9
Dissatisfaction with this system led to many efforts at re-
8. See Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 437-38 (1986).
9. See, e.g., Adams v. Hemmenway, 1 Mass. 145 (1804); Wilson v. Smith, 10
Wend. 324 (N.Y. 1833).
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form,"° eventually culminating in the establishment of the
Federal Rules in 1938.11
The drafters of the Federal Rules sought to remedy the
shortcomings of previous pleadings systems by crafting rules
that would not result in technical dismissals of meritorious
claims. 2 Consequently, rule 8(a)(2) merely requires "a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief." 13  The drafters intended this rule to ex-
press a preference for dispositions of cases on the merits, after
full disclosure through discovery, over dispositions based on
technical pleading failures. 4 The drafters reinforced this
purpose by proposing a rule that would allow pleadings to be
10. David Dudley Field, drafter of the 1948 New York Code, led the primary
reform movement. See Act of April 12, 1848, ch. 379, 1848 N.Y. Laws 497. The Field
Codes attempted to reduce the possibility of dispositions based on technicalities by
replacing the stylized forms of pleading with a general rule requiring a clear and
concise statement of the facts constituting the claim. Id. § 120(2); see also Marcus,
supra note 8, at 438.
The Field Codes failed, however, to eliminate technical dismissals. Courts
continued to dismiss claims on the ground that the pleadings did not assert the
necessary "ultimate facts," but only evidence of the claim or conclusions of law. See,
e.g., Neukirch v. McHugh, 165 A.D. 406, 409, 150 N.Y.S. 1032, 1035 (1914) (finding
that an allegation that a promise had been made in exchange for valuable consider-
ation was a mere conclusion of law); Fulton v. Varney, 117 A.D. 572, 575, 102 N.Y.S.
608, 611 (N.Y. App. Div. 1907) (same); cf. Leach v. Rhodes, 49 Ind. 291, 292 (1874)
(same). Unfortunately, because many legal concepts mix historical fact and legal
conclusion, courts were unable to develop coherent standards to distinguish ultimate
facts from conclusions of law. Consequently, courts continued to throw out a good
number of meritorious claims on the basis of technical pleading failures. See, e.g.,
cases cited supra.
11. In 1934, Congress passed the Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415,48 Stat.
1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988)). This Act authorized
the Supreme Court to develop and promulgate rules of procedure for the United
States district courts. Id. The Court appointed an advisory committee to prepare
and submit a draft of such rules. Appointment of Committee to Draft Unified System
of Equity and Law Rules, 295 U.S. 774 (1935). After reviewing and modifying the
rules submitted by the committee, the Court adopted a set of rules on December 20,
1937, which were sent to the Attorney General and then submitted by him to
Congress on January 3, 1938. Orders re Rules of Procedure, 302 U.S. 783 (1937);
Letter of Transmittal from the Attorney General of the United States to Congress
(Jan. 3, 1938), reprinted in 308 U.S. 647 (1938). Pursuant to the Act, the rules
became effective when Congress adjourned without acting to postpone their effective
date. See generally Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1015 (1982).
12. Charles Clark served as the Reporter of the Supreme Court's Committee on
the Rules of Civil Procedure, the committee that drafted the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Marcus, supra note 8, at 433. According to Clark, the drafters of the
Federal Rules set out to create a system that would favor dispositions of cases on
their merits. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U.L.Q. 297, 318-19 (1938).
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
14. Clark, supra note 12, at 318-19.
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amended liberally. 5 Although something akin to fact plead-
ing has been required in certain circumstances, 16 for the most
part the Federal Rules have achieved their liberal purpose,
and pleadings need do no more than give bare notice of the
claim to the opponent.'7
B. The Purpose of Summary Judgment
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pleadings serve
the simple purpose of providing notice of a claim or defense to
the opposing party." Consequently, they need not include
specific facts. Nor can a claim be dismissed for factual insuffi-
ciency; the motion to dismiss under the Federal Rules tests
only the legal sufficiency of a claim. 9 To challenge the
factual sufficiency of a claim under the Federal Rules, there-
fore, a party must move for summary judgment under rule 56.20
Because the Federal Rules do not require pleadings to
establish their own factual sufficiency, courts and commenta-
tors have noted that summary judgment is now the main
vehicle for disposing of frivolous claims.2 ' The advisory
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 15.
16. Marcus identifies three categories of cases in which courts have required
plaintiffs to plead detailed facts: securities fraud cases, civil rights cases, and cases
involving conspiracy allegations. See Marcus, supra note 8, at 447-50. For example,
see United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1980) (civil rights);
Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979) (securities fraud), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 946 (1980); Heart Disease Found. v. General Motors Corp., 463 F.2d 98 (2d
Cir. 1972) (conspiracy); see also, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 9(b) (stating that parties must
plead fraud with particularity).
17. See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947) ("The new rules,
however, restrict the pleadings to the task of general notice-giving .... "); see
generally Marcus, supra note 8, at 439-40.
18. See sources cited supra note 17.
19. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
20. FED. R. CIrv. P. 12(b) provides:
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of
the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56 ....
21. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) ("But with the
advent of 'notice pleading,' the motion to dismiss seldom fulfills this function [of
disposing of factually frivolous claims] any more, and its place has been taken by the
motion for summary judgment."); Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1196 (5th
Cir. 1986) ("The function of intercepting factually insufficient claims is now assigned
to the summary judgment."); Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Driver, 433 F.2d
FALL 1990]
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committee's note to the original rule states succinctly that
"[s]ummary judgment procedure is a method for promptly
disposing of actions in which there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact."2 2 In spite of this straightforward direc-
tive, at least one court held that a party could resist a
properly supported motion for summary judgment by relying
on the averments of her pleadings, at least if the averments
were "well-pleaded" and not conclusory. 23  The advisory
committee noted that the rules were amended in 1963 to
prevent this result.' Thus, the rule now specifically provides:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the
adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's re-
sponse, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial.25
The accompanying notes made the advisory committee's
purpose for this change quite clear: "The very mission of the
summary judgment procedure is to pierce the pleadings and to
assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine
need for trial."26 Therefore, if a party can adduce no facts
suggesting a genuine dispute about her claim, the court should
grant the opposing party's motion for summary judgment.
Only by forcing parties facing summary judgment motions
to show a reasonable factual basis for their claims can courts
insure that judicial resources are allocated appropriately. If
a reasonable jury could find only for the party moving for
summary judgment, trial would be a pointless exercise,
entailing unnecessary expenses for the judicial system and the
parties.
1137, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (noting that rule 56 serves 'admirably to eliminate...
frivolous lawsuits"); 10 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2712, at 579 (2d ed. 1983) (claiming that summary judgment 'is well
adapted to expose sham claims and defenses").
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 56, advisory committee's note to original rule.
23. See Frederick Hart & Co. v. Recordgraph Corp., 169 F.2d 580, 581 (3d Cir.
1948).
24. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e), advisory committee's note to 1963 amendment.
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
26. FED. R. CIrv. P. 56, advisory committee's note to 1963 amendment.
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Although the drafters of the Federal Rules anticipated the
importance of summary judgment in disposing of frivolous
claims, they probably did not foresee the increased significance
of discovery in modern litigation. Indeed, in many cases
today, discovery is the most costly aspect of the case.27
Discovery abuse, moreover, has become a major weapon in the
arsenals of many less-than-scrupulous litigants.28 Given the
heightened importance and spiraling costs of discovery in
modern litigation, courts should require parties seeking
further discovery in the face of a summary judgment motion
to demonstrate that they are seeking that discovery in good
faith and not merely to prolong the case in the hope that a
favorable settlement might be gained.
The purpose of summary judgment is to prevent the
wasting of judicial resources on useless trials. Few cases,
however, will ever get to trial even if they survive motions for
summary judgment.29 In these cases, the bulk of legal
resources will be spent conducting and supervising discov-
ery.3 ° Courts should not hesitate, therefore, to use summary
judgment to prevent the waste of resources not only on useless
trials but also on useless discovery.
27. See generally R. MARCUS & E. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 499-518 (1985); Brazil, The Adversary
Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV.
1295, 1296 (1978). Some commentators have asserted that the costs of discovery have
been overblown. See Felstiner, Grossman, Kritzer, Sarat & Trubek, The Costs of
Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 89-91 (1983). Their study revealed that
"relatively little discovery occurs in the ordinary lawsuit." Id. at 90. Their data also
indicated, however, that discovery occupies more attorney time (16.7%) than any
other activity. Id. at 91. Such findings suggest that although many cases involve
almost no discovery at all, discovery consumes more time than any other aspect of
those cases that do require it. Id. at 90-91. Professor Friedenthal contends that
discovery is probably not a problem in most cases, but acknowledges that in some
cases discovery costs are well out of proportion to the dispute. See Friedenthal, A
Divided Supreme Court Adopts Discovery Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 806, 816-17 (1981).
28. A recent Harris poll revealed that a significant number of federal judges (47%
of those surveyed) agree that discovery abuse is a major cause of delays in litigation,
and only a handful (7% of those surveyed) believe that it is not a cause of delay at all.
Louis Harris & Assocs., Inc., Judges' Opinions on Procedural Issues: A Survey of
State and Federal Trial Judges Who Spend at Least Half Their Time on General Civil
Cases, 69 B.U.L. REV. 731, 735 (1989) [hereinafter Harris Poll]. Seventy-three
percent of federal judges surveyed also believe that the "use of discovery as an
adversarial tool to intimidate or raise the stakes for their opponents" is a major cause
of excessive litigation costs in their courts. Id. at 752.
29. A 1983 survey found that only 5.4% of cases filed in federal district court ever
reach trial. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1983 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 142 (table 29) (1983).
30. See supra notes 27-28.
260 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 24:1
The general purpose of the Federal Rules, to afford every
action a "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination,"3 1
supports applying the rules in a way that disposes of factually
baseless claims as quickly as justice will allow. Devoting
scarce resources to frivolous suits deprives meritorious suits
of those resources and denies justice to deserving plaintiffs by
delaying the resolution of their claims.32 To allow discovery
on the basis of speculation undermines the essential goal of
the Federal Rules to prevent the wasting of resources on
frivolous claims. If a party knows that she can force discov-
ery, even if her claim is purely speculative, she may well bring
an action in the hope that the threat of discovery will be
sufficient to extract a favorable settlement from the defen-
dant.33 Through the proper use of the summary judgment
procedure, courts can prevent this result.
Courts should not, of course, expect parties to have fully
developed factual support for their claims before discovery
begins.34 The Federal Rules, however, should require a party
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
32. The recent Harris Poll indicates that a significant number of federal judges
believe that filing frivolous suits and making frivolous defenses cause serious delays
in the federal courts. Twenty-one percent of those surveyed thought frivolous suits
and defenses were a major cause of delay, while 70% believed they were a minor
cause. Harris Poll, supra note 28, at 735.
33. Benjamin R. Civiletti, former Attorney General of the United States,
concludes:
The judicial expansion of liability without regard to fault, the threat of
monumental awards, and the inordinate delays clearly provide incentives to
settle. Unfortunately, this may lead to the filing of more and more frivolous
suits in hopes of a settlement. As settlements become more probable, it is
likely, absent some controls, that more frivolous suits will be filed; and thus
the cycle continues. The continual filing and settling of such cases unneces-
sarily wastes our limited judicial resources, delays or impedes the trial or
disposition of all other legitimate cases, and adds to the costs.
Civiletti, Zeroing in on the Real Litigation Crisis: Irrational Justice, Needless Delays,
Excessive Costs, 46 MD. L. REV. 40, 47 (1986). This danger is especially great when
the potential damages from the action and the potential costs of discovery are large.
See, e.g., Paul Kadair, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 694 F.2d 1017, 1031 (5th Cir. 1983)
("[Tihe expensive and time consuming nature of antitrust litigation along with the
statutory treble damage remedy, may particularly inspire vexatious litigation, an evil
which summary judgment may guard against."); In re Commonwealth Oil/Tesoro
Petroleum Corp. Sec. Litigation, 467 F. Supp. 227, 250 (W.D. Tex. 1979) (warning
that courts should not give plaintiffs "unchecked access to the in terrorem [sic] power
of the federal discovery mechanism").
34. This is especially true in light of the recent Supreme Court decisions on
summary judgment. See infra notes 43-66 and accompanying text. Others agree.
In a concurring opinion in J.E. Mamiye & Sons, Inc. v. Fidelity Bank, 813 F.2d 610,
617 (3d Cir. 1987), Judge Becker suggested that the timing of summary judgment
motions is now crucial. Most plaintiffs, he noted, are unlikely to have sufficient
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seeking the expenditure of judicial resources on discovery to
establish some minimal factual predicate to support his
claim.35 Rule 11 places a duty on a party to determine, after
reasonable inquiry, that his claim is well grounded in fact.36
As a result, courts should presume a claim is well grounded
until the opposing party demonstrates that no genuine issue
of material fact exists-until, in other words, the opposing
party makes a properly supported motion for summary
judgment under rule 56(c).37 Once such a motion is made,
the burden shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to
make two showings: first, that he has a factual basis support-
ing his claim; and second, that this basis is, in light of the
offering made by the moving party, either sufficient to create
a genuine issue or sufficient to support a conclusion that
further discovery is reasonably likely to create a genuine
* 38issue.
Even if the court determines that summary judgment is not
appropriate at the time of the motion, it should use the
procedure to narrow the scope of discovery. Parties with
legitimate claims may be tempted to use the liberal discovery
rules to prolong the litigation in an attempt to garner a
favorable settlement.39 Under the existing rule 56(f), the
evidence to raise a genuine issue on every element when the complaint is filed, but
these claims should not be dismissed before plaintiffs have had any opportunity to
develop the facts. Id.
35. There is some dispute over this issue. Professor Friedenthal argues: "The
very purpose of permitting pleadings based upon good faith speculation must be to
permit plaintiffs to employ the discovery provisions to determine whether a valid case
in fact exists." Friedenthal, supra note 27, at 816. He is particularly concerned with
cases in which crucial facts "are to be found only in the files and minds of opposing
parties." Id. at 817. Others disagree. See, e.g., Kirkham, Complex Civil Litiga-
tion-Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70 F.R.D. 199, 202 (1976) ("When notice
pleading dumps into the lap of a court an enormous controversy without the slightest
guide to what the court is asked to decide; when discovery-totally unlimited because
no issue is framed-mulls over millions of papers . . . we should, I think, consider
whether noble experiments have gone awry."); Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of
Our Courts?, 70 F.R.D. 96, 106-07 (1976) (suggesting that, to prevent claims based
on the mere hope that discovery will uncover facts supporting the claim, discovery
should not be allowed until a party has shown the probable merit of his claim);
Rosenberg, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Action: Assessing Their Impact, 137
U. PA. L. REV. 2197, 2206 (1989) (arguing that the "purpose of discovery is not to find
out whether the pleader has any supportable claim or defense of whatever kind" but
rather "to develop support for a position that at the time of pleading already has
some tenable basis in fact and law").
36. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
38. FED. R. CIv. P. 56(e)-(f).
39. See supra note 33.
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court can prevent such an abuse of discovery by initially
limiting discovery to that which is reasonably likely to produce
information that will create a genuine issue of material
fact.4" For this reason, if a summary judgment motion can be
properly supported, it is a good strategy even if the moving
party believes that the court is likely to grant additional time.
If it accomplishes nothing else, such a motion will force the
opposing party to reveal her factual predicate and justify her
requests for discovery.
C. Recent Developments
in the Law of Summary Judgment
In a series of cases decided in 1986, the Supreme Court
sent a message to the lower federal courts that summary
judgment is an important part of the Federal Rules mandate
"to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action."4 Those cases encouraged greater use and
acceptance of summary judgment motions and decreased the
moving party's burden on issues where the opposing party
bears the burden of proof.42 Thus, the Supreme Court has
40. See First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 265 (1968) (noting that
rule 56(f) "provides for comparatively limited discovery for the purpose of showing
facts sufficient to withstand a summary judgment motion, rather than Rule 26, which
provides for broad pretrial discovery"); New Am. Shipbuilders, Inc. v. United States,
871 F.2d 1077, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (upholding a stay of discovery and noting that
'[o]ne important advantage sought by the rules from the summary judgment
procedure is to save the parties and the court the time and cost that may be wasted
in pursuit of irrelevant facts by discovery").
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 1; see supra note 1 and accompanying text.
42. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. The literature on these cases is
already extensive. See, e.g., Childress, A New Era for Summary Judgments: Recent
Shifts at the Supreme Court, 6 REV. LITIGATION 263 (1987), reprinted in 116 F.R.D.
183 (1987); Friedenthal, Cases on Summary Judgment: Has There Been a Material
Change in Standards?, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 770 (1988); Kennedy, Federal
Summary Judgment: Reconciling Celotex v. Catrett with Adickes v. Kress and the
Evidentiary Problems under Rule 56, 6 REV. LITIGATION 227 (1987); Mullenix,
Summary Judgment: Taming the Beast of Burdens, 10 Am. J. TRIAL ADvOC. 433
(1987); Nelken, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Summary Judgment After
Celotex, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 53 (1988); Pierce, Summary Judgment: A Favored Means
of Summarily Resolving Disputes, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 279 (1987); Risinger, Another
Step in the Counter-Revolution: A Summary Judgment on the Supreme Court's New
Approach to Summary Judgment, 54 BROOKLYN L. REV. 35 (1988); Stempel, A
Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of Summary Judgment,
Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95 (1988); Note, No
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shifted the battleground of summary judgment, asking not
whether the moving party has demonstrated beyond reason-
able inferences that no genuine issue of material fact exists,
but whether the nonmoving party should be allowed to pursue
further discovery.
This shift reflects a change in the substantive law and the
Supreme Court's attitude toward the use of summary judg-
ment. In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,43 for example, the Court
upheld summary judgment for the defendant in an asbestos
product liability suit. After a year of discovery, the plaintiff
had failed to produce any evidence showing the decedent's
exposure to defendant's products.44 Nonetheless, the D.C.
Circuit had held that summary judgment was inappropriate
because the defendant had not supported its motion with
evidence negating the allegation of exposure.45
The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning. The Court
rested its decision in part on the language of rule 56(c), which
provides that a motion shall be granted if the pleadings and
depositions, together with any affidavits, reveal no genuine
issue of material fact, and rules 56(a) and (b), which provide
that parties may move for summary judgment "with or
without supporting affidavits."46 Focusing on the language
that makes affidavits optional, the Court concluded that the
moving party does not have to produce evidence showing the
absence of a genuine issue. 7 Instead, the moving party can
discharge his initial burden simply by showing that the
nonmoving party has not produced any evidence in support of
an element on which the movant will bear the burden of proof
at trial. Once the movant shows that no evidence has been
produced, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to
produce evidence suggesting he will be able to carry his
burden at trial.48
More Litigation Gambles: Toward a New Summary Judgment, 28 B.C.L. REV. 747
(1987) (authored by Kyle M. Roberston).
43. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
44. Id. at 319.
45. Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 756 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1985), rev'd sub
nom. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
46. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; FED R. CIV. P. 56(a)-(c).
47. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24.
48. Id. at 322-23.
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In reaching this decision, the Court noted specifically that
this standard would not expose plaintiffs to premature
summary judgments because rule 56(f) insures that each party
has an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery.49 The
Court also noted, however, that courts should not hesitate to
grant summary judgment in appropriate circumstances. °
Indeed, the Court emphasized that the interests of parties
facing factually baseless claims should not be sacrificed in an
all-out effort to prevent the premature disposition of legiti-
mate claims:
Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only for
the rights of persons asserting claims and defenses that
are adequately based in fact to have those claims and
defenses tried to a jury, but also for the rights of persons
opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the
manner provided by the Rule, prior to trial, that the
claims and defenses have no factual basis.5'
This recognition of the rights of moving parties constitutes a
significant shift in the Court's attitude toward summary
judgment,52 a shift that favors more frequent use of summary
judgments to dispose of frivolous claims.
In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp. , the district court granted summary judgment to over
twenty antitrust defendants, finding that an inference of
predatory pricing and attempted monopolization was unrea-
sonable. 4 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit re-
versed, concluding that there was sufficient evidence to allow
an inference of concerted action.55 The Supreme Court, in
49. Id. at 326.
50. Id. at 327.
51. Id.
52. For a less receptive attitude toward summary judgment, see Adickes v. S.H.
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159 (1970) (emphasizing the moving party's burden to
show the absence of a genuine issue concerning any material fact). Although the
Court in Celotex reconciled its holding with Adickes, see 477 U.S. at 325-26, Adickes
had been interpreted by the court of appeals in Celotex to require affirmative
evidence of the absence of any genuine issue. See Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 756 F.2d 181, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1985), rev'd sub nom. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317 (1986).
53. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
54. Id. at 519.
55. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. (In re Japanese Elec.
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turn, reversed the Third Circuit and remanded the case,
ordering that summary judgment be reinstated."
The Court characterized the nonmoving plaintiff's duty as
something more than raising some doubt as to the material
facts: "When the moving party has carried its burden under
Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that
there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."57
Indeed, the Court indicated that the proper standard for
determining a summary judgment motion is similar to the
standard used for the trial motion for directed verdicts:
"Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational
trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no
'genuine issue for trial.' "58 The issue, therefore, is not
whether the evidence is sufficient to raise an inference to be
resolved at trial, but whether it is sufficient to support a
verdict for the nonmoving party.
In practical terms, this means that a plaintiff must do more
than provide sufficient evidence to raise an inference that
would support a verdict in her favor. She must supply enough
evidence so that a rational trier of fact could reach that
inference rather than a competing one.59 Before Matsushita,
courts could have held that competing inferences precluded
summary judgment.6" Under the standard established in
Matsushita, if a party moving for summary judgment can show
that the inference supporting its position is the only "reason-
able" inference, then summary judgment is proper.
Finally, in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.," a libel case,
the Court held that summary judgments, like directed
verdicts, must meet the substantive standard of proof required
at trial.6 Using the trial standard meant that the plaintiff,
to defeat a motion for summary judgment, had to provide
enough evidence that a rational trier of fact could find actual
malice by clear and convincing evidence.6
Again, as in the prior two cases, the Court used language
that favors summary judgment where the opponent's evidence
Prods. Antitrust Litigation), 723 F.2d 238, 304-05 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd, 475 U.S. 574
(1986).
56. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 578-80.
57. Id. at 586 (footnote omitted).
58. Id. at 587.
59. Id. at 588.
60. Childress, supra note 42, at 187.
61. Id.; see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588.
62. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
63. Id. at 254.
64. Id.
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"is merely colorable" or "is not significantly probative."65 In
Anderson, the Court carried this standard to its logical conclu-
sion. To determine if the opponent's evidence is sufficiently
probative, the trial judge "must bear in mind the actual
quantum and quality of proof necessary to support liabili-
ty."6  Thus, where a party will face a higher burden of proof
at trial, it will have to produce more probative evidence to
defeat a motion for summary judgment.
As a result of these cases, summary judgment motions now
possess considerably more bite. Indeed, the summary judg-
ment motion has taken on the character of a factual-sufficien-
cy motion. 7 Although some scholars have strongly criticized
this result,6" it is consistent with the philosophy behind
notice pleading.69 Because pleadings need only provide notice
and cannot be challenged for lack of factual sufficiency, using
a summary judgment motion to challenge the factual sufficien-
cy of a claim is sensible. The greatest danger posed by this
use of summary judgment motions is that potentially legiti-
mate claims will be dismissed prematurely. The drafters
anticipated this problem and sought to alleviate it by provid-
ing trial judges with discretion to grant continuances of
summary judgment motions for further discovery.70 Now
that the Supreme Court has reduced the burden of a party
moving for summary judgment, that rule has become the new
battleground for summary judgment motions.
65. Id. at 249-50.
66. Id. at 254.
67. By factual-sufficiency motion, I mean a motion that tests the factual basis of
a nonmoving party's claim to see if it has sufficient factual support so that a rational
trier of fact could find in favor of the nonmoving party at trial.
68. The most thorough critique is Stempel, supra note 42. Stempel criticizes the
Supreme Court's trio of 1986 decisions on several different levels. He argues that
making summary judgments easier to obtain will shift power from plaintiffs to
defendants. Such a shift, he adds, will only further skew an already unbalanced
adversarial system that favors large and wealthy litigants over small and poor
litigants. Id. at 159-60. Moreover, he contends that increased availability of
summary judgment will diminish the role and the authority of the civil jury and
therefore will decrease the community's confidence in the reliability of judgments.
Id. at 162-70. He also suggests that the decisions will have no substantial effect on
judicial efficiency, because the costs of litigating summary judgment motions are
nearly as high as the costs of conducting trials. Id. at 171-72. Finally, he contends
that "making summary judgment too easy adversely reduces the accuracy of court
decisions." Id. at 173. Some commentators, on the other hand, have criticized the
trilogy for making it too difficult to obtain summary judgment. See Mullenix, supra
note 42, at 474-75; Nelken, supra note 42, at 75, 83.
69. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
70. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(f).
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II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
AND APPLICATION OF RULE 56(F)
Even before the trilogy of 1986 opinions, many parties
appealed summary judgments on the ground that the district
court should have granted them a continuance under rule
56(f). 71 Now that the Court has altered the burdens of the
parties on a summary judgment motion in a way that favors
moving parties, an increasing number of opponents have
sought, and undoubtedly will continue to seek, the protection
of rule 56(f). 72 A good deal of this litigation has reached the
appellate level, and the courts of appeals have often applied
conflicting standards in resolving these disputes.
Among other things, courts have considered the type of
filing necessary to invoke the rule,73 what must be shown to
obtain its protection, 74 whether summary judgment is appro-
priate before any discovery, 75 and whether a continuance may
be obtained without any factual showing supporting the
party's claim.76 I will now examine each of these factors.
A. What Kind of Filing is Necessary
to Invoke the Protection of Rule 56(t)?
As a preliminary matter, I should emphasize that if a
motion for summary judgment is supported properly and the
adverse party does not set forth specific facts showing a
genuine issue for trial, summary judgment must be entered;
it is not a matter of judicial discretion.77 Rule 56(f) softens
the harshness of this rule by giving the judge discretion under
certain limited circumstances:
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing
the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated
71. See infra notes 79, 82, 94.
72. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
73. See infra Part II.A.
74. See infra Part II.B.
75. See infra Part II.C.
76. See infra Part II.D.
77. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
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present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's
opposition, the court may refuse the application for
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affida-
vits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discov-
ery to be had or may make such other order as is just.78
Although the rule provides that a judge may avoid granting
summary judgment only when it appears from the affidavits
that the party cannot present facts essential to justify the
party's opposition, courts have not always required affidavits
before exercising their discretion. Some courts of appeals have
gone so far as to overturn judgments where a district court
refused to grant a continuance because the opponent failed to
comply with the affidavit requirement.79 "Form," according
to these appellate courts, "is not to be exalted over fair proce-
dures."8" Another court, however, suggested that the failure
to file an affidavit should be considered in determining
"whether the district court abused its discretion by ruling on
the motion when it did."81 Other courts have upheld rulings
that filing an affidavit is necessary to obtain the protection of
rule 56(f).82
78. FED. R. CIrv. P. 56(f). Rule 56(e) provides that "affidavits shall be made on
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated
therein." FED. R. CIrV. P. 56(e). Thus, any submission under rule 56(f) would have
to meet these requirements to constitute an affidavit under rule 56(e).
79. See First Chicago Int'l v. United Exch. Co., 836 F.2d 1375, 1380 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (finding that outstanding interrogatories and document requests together with
plaintiffs "Statement of a [sic] Material Facts as to Which There Is a Genuine
Dispute" "sufficed to alert the district court of the need for further discovery and thus
served as the functional equivalent of an affidavit"); Garrett v. City & County of San
Francisco, 818 F.2d 1515, 1518 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that plaintiffs pending
discovery motion satisfied the requirements of rule 56(f)); Cowan v. J.C. Penney Co.,
790 F.2d 1529, 1532 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that failure to file rule 56(f) affidavit
did not justify entry of summary judgment while discovery requests were still
outstanding); Sames v. Gable, 732 F.2d 49, 52 n.3 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating that failure
to file rule 56(f) affidavit was not "sufficiently egregious to warrant a non-merits
resolution of [plaintiffs'] claims"); Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co., 483 F.2d 1140, 1145-46
(5th Cir.) (en banc) (finding that a docketed letter signed by plaintiffs attorney
satisfied the spirit of rule 56(f)), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1116 (1973).
80. Littlejohn, 483 F.2d at 1146.
81. Bryant v. Ford Motor Co., 886 F.2d 1526, 1534 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied
110 S. Ct. 1126 (1990).
82. See Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 850 F.2d 1373, 1376 (10th Cir.
1988) (noting that rule 56(f) "protection arises only if the nonmoving party files an
affidavit explaining why he or she cannot present facts to oppose the motion");
Chicago Florsheim Shoe Store Co. v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., 826 F.2d 725, 727 (7th
Cir. 1987) (finding that because plaintiff failed to submit a rule 56(f) affidavit or move
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Courts that allow some deviation from the strict letter of
rule 56(f) have the stronger argument. The intent of the
drafters to infuse the Federal Rules with a spirit of procedural
liberality is evident throughout the rules themselves as well
as the advisory committee's notes.8 3 Indeed, one of the goals
behind drafting the rules was to minimize dismissals based on
technical failings of procedure.84  To grant summary judg-
ment where discovery seems likely to create a genuine issue
for trial, simply because a party failed to file the proper
affidavit, runs counter to the general spirit of the rules.85
Although a flexible application of rule 56(f) may sometimes
be necessary to avoid injustice, an approach that ignores the
limits placed on judicial discretion would undermine the
for continuance, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled on
defendant's motion for summary judgment); Pasternak v. Lear Petroleum Explora-
tion, Inc., 790 F.2d 828, 832-33 (10th Cir. 1986) ("Where a party opposing summary
judgment and seeking a continuance pending completion of discovery fails to take
advantage of the shelter provided by Rule 56(f) by filing an affidavit, there is no
abuse of discretion in granting summary judgment if it is otherwise appropriate.");
Weir v. Anaconda Co., 773 F.2d 1073, 1080 n.4 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding that when
a plaintiff could not establish sufficient facts to show a genuine issue for trial and
failed to file a rule 56(f) affidavit, summary judgment against him was appropriate);
Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp. v. Esprit De Corp., 769 F.2d 919, 926 (2d
Cir. 1985) ("A memorandum is not a substitute for an affidavit under Rule 56(f) ...
."); Shavrnoch v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 726 F.2d 291, 294 (6th Cir. 1984) ("In the
absence of [a rule 56(f)] affidavit, the district court had no reason to delay entry of
judgment...."); Wallace v. Brownell Pontiac-GMC Co., 703 F.2d 525, 527 (11th Cir.
1983) ([A] trial court is under no obligation to treat such motions [motions to compel
discovery and motions to strike] and responses as satisfying the requirements of
subsection (f).").
83. Rule 15(a), for example, provides that leave to amend pleadings "shall be
freely given when justice so requires." FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Further, rule 15(c)
allows amendments in most cases to relate back to the time of the original filing, and
allows amendments changing the party against whom the complaint is asserted,
unless the party shows prejudice. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c). And rule 54(c) directs the
court to grant parties any relief to which they are entitled after trial, whether they
requested it in their pleadings or not. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(c); see also FED. R. CIv. P.
15, advisory committee's note to original rule.
84. See supra note 12.
85. See Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co., 483 F.2d 1140, 1145-46 (5th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1116 (1973). Courts may be more reluctant to apply the spirit
of the rules rather than the plain language of them in light of the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Pavelic & Leflore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 110 S. Ct. 456
(1989). There, the Court declined to extend rule 11 liability to a firm, even though
the violative filing had been signed in an individual's name on behalf of the firm.
The Court reached this holding in part because it viewed as its task "to apply the text
[of the Federal Rule], not to improve upon it." Id. at 460. A similar reading of rule
56(f) would probably strictly require affidavits before the granting a continuance.
Such a possibility is further reason to loosen the affidavit requirement of the rule.
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language of the rule that summary judgment be mandatory
when appropriate. Strict compliance with the affidavit
requirement, therefore, should not always be necessary for the
court to exercise its discretion, but when the opponent has not
filed an affidavit, the court should demand a close substitute
that satisfies the rule's purpose for requiring affidavits. As
the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit noted, "[t]he purpose
of the affidavit is to ensure that the nonmoving party is
invoking the protections of Rule 56(f) in good faith by affirma-
tively demonstrating why he cannot respond to the summary
judgment motion."6 By requiring an affidavit, the court
ensures good faith because it subjects the maker of the
affidavit to the sanctions of rule 56(g) if the affidavit is
presented in bad faith."
Courts, therefore, should only accept alternatives to
affidavits if the maker can be subjected to sanctions for any
bad-faith statements.8 8 Unfortunately, most courts either
have approached alternative proffers in a haphazard manner,
allowing them whenever the result appears just, or have not
allowed them at all.89 The First Circuit, however, recently
articulated some helpful guidelines:
When a departure occurs, the alternative proffer must
simulate the rule in important ways. It should be made
in written form and in a timely manner (that is, served
with the response to the motion or filed with the court
at the earliest practicable date thereafter) .... The
statement must be made, if not by affidavit, then in
86. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 25 v. Attorney Gen. of the United
States, 804 F.2d 1256, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated on other grounds, 808 F.2d 847
(D.C. Cir. 1987); see also 846 F.2d 1499, 1501, 1513 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc)
(recognizing other grounds for vacating the opinion).
87. Rule 56(g) provides that if affidavits are filed in bad faith, "the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount of the
reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused the other party to incur,
including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be
adjudged guilty of contempt." FED. R. CIv. P. 56(g).
88. An example of an alternative that would fail this test is an argument made
by an attorney either in a brief opposing summary judgment or during a hearing
before the court. The Third Circuit explained the inadequacy of an attorney's
arguments in a recent decision:
We cannot diminish the value of an affidavit by permitting an attorney's
unsworn statement to replace it. The adversary system recognizes the right
and practice of attorneys to take adversarial license with evidence and argue
it as fact. It does not recognize argument as a surrogate for either evidence
or fact. Thus, the statement is lacking both in substance, and in any indicia
of evidentiary reliability contemplated by the requirements of Rule 56.
Radich v. Goode, 886 F.2d 1391, 1394-95 (3d Cir. 1989).
89. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
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some authoritative manner-say, by the party under
penalty of perjury or by written representations of
counsel subject to the strictures of Fed.R.Civ.P. 11-and
filed with the court.90
These guidelines preserve the purpose of the affidavit require-
ment and uphold an identifiable limit on judicial discretion,
yet prevent the dismissal of potentially valid claims on
procedural technicalities.
B. What Must a Party Show to Obtain a
Continuance for Further Discovery?
Rule 56(f) allows courts to deny or delay summary judg-
ments when the party opposing the motion states by affidavit
the reasons why he cannot "present by affidavit facts essential
to justify [his] opposition."91 Generally, courts have inter-
preted this rule to require a party desiring a continuance to
show:
1) the nature of the uncompleted discovery, i.e., what
facts are sought and how they are to be obtained;
2) how those facts are reasonably expected to create
a genuine issue of material fact;
3) what efforts the affiant has made to obtain those
facts; and
4) why those efforts were unsuccessful.92
In almost every case where a court of appeals has upheld a
denial of a continuance, the nonmoving party failed to estab-
lish one or more of these elements.93
By far the most frequent reason that courts deny requests
for continuances is that the requests do not identify with
sufficient specificity the facts to be discovered.94  A
90. Paterson-Leitch Co. v. Massachusetts Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 840 F.2d 985,
988 (1st Cir. 1988).
91. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(f).
92. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp. v. Esprit De Corp., 769 F.2d 919,
926 (2d Cir. 1985). For similar formulations, see Dowling v. City of Philadelphia, 855
F.2d 136, 140 (3d Cir. 1988); Paterson-Leitch, 840 F.2d at 988.
93. See infra notes 94-108 and accompanying text.
94. See Mackey v. Pioneer Nat'l Bank, 867 F.2d 520, 523-24 (9th Cir. 1989);
Barona Group of the Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. American Manage-
ment & Amusement, Inc., 840 F.2d 1394, 1400 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 487
U.S. 1247 (1989); Hancock Indus. v. Schaeffer, 811 F.2d 225, 230 (3d Cir. 1987); Otto
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conclusory statement asserting merely that discovery will yield
essential, but unspecified, facts will almost certainly fail to
convince a court to order a continuance. In a trademark
registration case, for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit found that the following affidavit did not
satisfy rule 56(f):
Answers to Opposer's pending requests for discovery,
and possibly affidavits, depositions, or other discovery
will be required to respond to Applicant's Motion for
Summary Judgment. There is certain information
regarding Applicant's use of its mark, channels of trade
and other evidence necessary to prepare a response that
is solely in the possession of the Applicant.95
The court denied the continuance, reasoning that "[i]f all one
had to do to obtain a grant of a Rule 56(f) motion were to
allege possession by movant of'certain information' and 'other
evidence,' every summary judgment decision would have to be
delayed while the non-movant goes fishing in the movant's
files."9 6
A rule 56(f) motion should specifically identify the facts to
be discovered because the court needs to know whether the
facts, if found, will create a genuine issue. If they will not,
then the court need not waste judicial resources trying to
uncover them. Similarly, there is no reason to pursue
discovery that will only produce inadmissible evidence. For
example, in a case where a party sought a continuance to
discover parol evidence to rebut a written agreement, the court
denied the request because the evidence, even if uncovered,
would not have been admissible at trial.97
v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 814 F.2d 1127, 1138 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
486 U.S. 1026 (1988); Koplove v. Ford Motor Co., 795 F.2d 15, 18 (3d Cir. 1986); Brae
Transp., Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 790 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1986); Bettin v.
Nelson, 744 F.2d 53, 58 (8th Cir. 1984); Taylor v. Gallagher, 737 F.2d 134, 137 (1st
Cir. 1984); SEC v. Spence & Green Chem. Co., 612 F.2d 896, 900-01 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1082 (1981); Robin Constr. Co. v. United States, 345 F.2d 610,
614 (3d Cir. 1965).
95. Keebler Co. v. Murray Bakery Prods., 866 F.2d 1386, 1387 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
96. Id. at 1389.
97. United States ex rel. Small Business Admin. v. Light, 766 F.2d 394, 396 (8th
Cir. 1985) (per curiam).
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Once a party has identified specific facts he seeks to
uncover through discovery, he must demonstrate some
plausible basis for his belief that these facts exist and also
must demonstrate a realistic prospect that they can be
obtained within a reasonable amount of additional time.98
He must also establish that such facts are reasonably likely to
create a genuine issue.9 If the additional facts will be
merely cumulative, immaterial, or not sufficiently probative to
support a verdict for the nonmoving party at trial, the court
should deny the request for a continuance and grant summary
judgment. 00
Finally, a party seeking a continuance under rule 56(f)
must describe efforts she has already made to obtain the
needed information and why those efforts have been unsuc-
cessful.1"' Generally, a party can satisfy this requirement by
showing that the party moving for summary judgment has
exclusive control over the specific information needed and has
not responded to discovery requests. 102 Indeed, one court
98. See Paterson-Leitch Co. v. Massachusetts Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 840 F.2d
985, 988 (lst Cir. 1988).
99. See, e.g., id.
100. See Patty Precision v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg., 742 F.2d 1260, 1264-65 (10th
Cir. 1984); see also, e.g., Shipes v. Hanover Ins. Co., 884 F.2d 1357, 1361-62 (11th Cir.
1989) (finding that where the district court had determined that defendant had
established its good faith as a matter of law, further discovery on that issue was
immaterial and summary judgment was appropriate); Hudson River Sloop
Clearwater, Inc. v. Department of the Navy, 891 F.2d 414, 422 (2d Cir. 1989)
(affirming summary judgment for the Navy where plaintiff's claim depended on
existence of official Navy statements because any official statements would have been
matters of public record and thus, requested discovery would reveal nothing new).
It is important to note, however, that although these standards appear stringent,
courts usually apply them liberally in favor of the nonmoving party because of the
severity of granting summary judgment. See Union City Barge Line, Inc. v. Union
Carbide Corp., 823 F.2d 129, 136 (5th Cir. 1987) ("The continuance is a safe harbor
built into the rules so that summary judgment is not granted prematurely.... Given
the precautionary nature of the rule, these requests ordinarily are treated and
reviewed liberally. Technical, rigid scrutiny of a Rule 56(f) motion is inappropriate.");
Patty Precision, 742 F.2d at 1264 (noting that an affidavit under rule 56(f) should be
treated liberally). The lenient application of this vague rule, however, is one of the
chief causes of inconsistent results. Because liberality is probably appropriate in
some circumstances, a precise rule on continuances is needed all the more to enhance
consistency and predictability.
101. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., Costlow v. United States, 552 F.2d 560, 564 (3d Cir. 1977); Willmar
Poultry Co. v. Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 520 F.2d 289, 294 (8th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 915 (1976).
These cases deal only with information controlled by parties moving for summary
judgment, leaving open the possibility that a distinction could be drawn between
discovery of moving parties and discovery of third parties. Such a distinction would
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has gone so far as to say that "where the facts are in posses-
sion of the moving party a continuance of a motion for
summary judgment for purposes of discovery should be
granted almost as a matter of course." 103 If a party has
diligently pursued essential information in the exclusive
possession of the moving party, the court should not grant
summary judgment before it has reviewed that information.
A party may run into trouble on this final requirement if he
cannot show exclusive control by the moving party or if he has
not pursued discovery diligently. 04 Where a party should be
able to create a genuine issue by filing his own affidavit and
fails to do so, the court will probably not allow the party to
conduct further discovery. In a civil rights action, for example,
the Third Circuit upheld a summary judgment partly because
the plaintiff had not filed her own affidavit explaining the
violation.105 Similarly, in a Fifth Circuit case involving the
appointment of a receiver, the court upheld the denial of a
continuance on the grounds that plaintiffs had not filed their
own affidavit as to matters necessarily known by them, such
as their financial condition. 106
Additionally, courts will deny a rule 56(f) motion if the
party making it has been dilatory in pursuing discovery.
make little sense. After all, the purpose of requiring the opponent of a summary
judgment motion to show exclusive control by another party is to force the opponent
to explain why she does not have the facts necessary to oppose the motion. See supra
note 92 and accompanying text. Whether those facts are controlled by the moving
party or by a third party, they are inaccessible to the opponent prior to discovery.
Consequently, it would be patently unfair to grant summary judgment before
allowing the opponent access to the needed facts. Of course, if the opponent fails to
pursue her discovery options diligently, she should not be entitled to exert her own
dilatoriness as a defense to the summary judgment motion. See infra notes 107-08
and accompanying text. Perhaps courts should be more tolerant of delay when the
essential information is in the hands of the moving party, because the moving party
is more likely to resist discovery than parties that are not involved in the litigation.
This assumption is really unnecessary, however. If an opponent to a summary
judgment motion can demonstrate that she has attempted to discover essential
information and that discovery has been resisted, the court should grant the
continuance regardless of whether the resisting party is the moving party or a third
party. Moreover, if the opponent has been dilatory, she should not be able to
exonerate herself simply by saying that the moving party controls essential
information.
103. Costlow, 552 F.2d at 564.
104. See supra notes 105-08.
105. Dowling v. City of Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 140 (3d Cir. 1988).
106. Woods v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 826 F.2d 1400, 1414 (5th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988).
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Courts, as a rule, expect parties to prosecute their claims
diligently. They will not tolerate tardiness in pursuing claims
as a backdoor defense to a summary judgment motion. °7
Although courts vary somewhat in what they consider dilatory,
if a party fails to conduct discovery for a period of several
months, most courts will probably not be receptive to a rule
56(f) motion for a continuance.
0 8
C. May a Court Grant Summary Judgment
Before Any Discovery?
Although rule 56(b) provides that a defendant may move for
summary judgment at any time,109 some courts have been
unwilling to uphold summary judgments before the plaintiff
has had an opportunity for discovery."0 Other courts have
upheld summary judgments granted before any discovery,
where the nonmoving party had not satisfied the requirements
of rule 56(f)."
Rule 56(f) obligates a party to demonstrate that her claim
is being pursued in good faith. The Eighth Circuit has noted
the proper limits of the protection of rule 56(f):
107. See, e.g., Chung Wing Ping v. Kennedy, 294 F.2d 735, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
108. See, e.g., Paul Kadair, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 694 F.2d 1017, 1031 (5th Cir.
1983) (affirming denial of a continuance against plaintiff who conducted no discovery
for 10 to 12 months after filing the complaint); Aviation Specialties, Inc. v. United
Technologies Corp., 568 F.2d 1186, 1189, 1193 (5th Cir. 1978) (finding summary
judgment proper where plaintiff conducted no discovery for a seven-month period);
and King v. National Indus., Inc., 512 F.2d 29, 34 (6th Cir. 1975) (affirming summary
judgment against plaintiff who had more than a year to conduct discovery).
109. FED. R. CIv. P. 56(b).
110. See, e.g., WSB-TV v. Lee, 842 F.2d 1266, 1269 (11th Cir. 1988); Cowan v. J.C.
Penney Co., 790 F.2d 1529, 1532 (11th Cir. 1986).
111. See, e.g., Washington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 901 F.2d 1281, 1284-86 (5th Cir.
1990); Keebler Co. v. Murray Bakery Prods., 866 F.2d 1386, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
("Before us Keebler relies entirely on its having had no discovery at all, noting that
requests denied in earlier cases were for additional discovery. Rule 56(f), however,
makes no such distinction; on the contrary, the Rule requires that each request for
discovery be adequately supported by a showing of need."); THI-Hawaii, Inc. v. First
Commerce Fin. Corp., 627 F.2d 991, 994 (9th Cir. 1980). It should be noted that
although a summary judgment before discovery appears to be equivalent to a
dismissal under rule 12(b)(6), it is really quite different. A dismissal under rule
12(b)(6) is based on the plaintiffs failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted and usually is delayed until the party has had an opportunity to amend her
complaint under rule 15. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6), 15. Summary judgment, on the
other hand, is based on the plaintiffs failure to produce facts sufficient to raise a
genuine issue for trial. See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
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Rule 56(f) is not a shield that can be raised to block a
motion for summary judgment without even the slightest
showing by the opposing party that his opposition is
meritorious. A party invoking its protections must do so
in good faith by affirmatively demonstrating why he
cannot respond to a movant's affidavits as otherwise
required by Rule 56(e) and how postponement of a ruling
on the motion will enable him, by discovery or other
means, to rebut the movant's showing of the absence of
a genuine issue of fact. Where, as here, a party fails to
carry his burden under Rule 56(f), postponement of a
ruling on a motion for summary judgment is unjus-
tified.
112
If a party faces a motion for summary judgment, the rule
requires the party to reassure the court that her claim has
some basis in reality. 113 Rule 56(f) forces a party to show a
reasonable likelihood that discovery will produce facts
sufficient to raise a genuine issue. It does not distinguish
between a party that has nearly finished discovery and one
that has not yet begun."4 Nor should it. Neither a party
who has had extensive discovery nor one who is just beginning
discovery should be able to hide behind rule 56(f) and obtain
a continuance without making an affirmative showing. In
either case, the party opposing summary judgment has the
burden to show that it is reasonably likely that, after discov-
ery, dismissal of the claim will no longer be warranted.
Obviously, if discovery is nearly complete, a party will be
hard-pressed to show that further discovery will reveal
anything new. If no discovery has been taken, on the other
hand, the opposing party will have a great deal of room to
argue that discovery will uncover facts sufficient to create a
genuine issue. But even when no discovery has been taken,
the court should require a showing that discovery will reveal
an issue for trial. If a court permits discovery in the absence
of this affirmative showing, judicial resources will be expended
needlessly on a claim that probably will be dismissed after
discovery.
112. Willmar Poultry Co. v. Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 520 F.2d 289, 297 (8th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 915 (1976).
113. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
114. See FED. R. CIv. P. 56(f).
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D. May a Party Obtain a Continuance
Under Rule 56(f) Without Any Factual Showing
Supporting His Claim?
On its face, rule 56(f) does not require any factual showing
supporting a party's claim. It calls only for a statement of the
reasons why the party cannot make a sufficient factual
showing at that time to raise a genuine issue." 5 Is it sensi-
ble, however, to grant a party a continuance for discovery
when she can produce no facts supporting her claim? Several
courts have considered the issue." 6  The more thoughtful
decisions rule that a plaintiff must make some factual showing
to avoid losing on summary judgment.
In Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. United States Postal
Service,"7 for example, the plaintiff alleged a conspiracy to
deprive it of its nonprofit organization postal permit because
of its members' religious beliefs."' The plaintiff produced no
evidence to support these vague allegations." 9  The defen-
dant moved for summary judgment and supported its motions
with affidavits explaining its actions. 2 ° The district court
granted the motion, and the Second Circuit affirmed, conclud-
ing that "the district court acted well within its discretion in
preventing the plaintiff from burdening the defendants with
a needless round of discovery in this frivolous lawsuit." 2'
Although the plaintiff apparently did not satisfy its normal
burden under rule 56(f), the court emphasized the complete
absence of factual support for the plaintiffs claim: "Where a
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Emmons v. McLaughlin, 874 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1989); Kamen v.
AT&T, 791 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1986); Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190 (5th Cir.
1986); Paul Kadair, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 694 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1983);
Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 648 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1981);
Bryant v. O'Connor, 671 F. Supp. 1279 (D. Kan. 1986), affd, 848 F.2d 1064 (10th Cir.
1988). These cases involve fact patterns similar to those in which some courts have
required more specific pleadings. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. None
of these cases were dismissed under rule 12(b)(6), however. These courts did not
require more specific pleading. Instead, they required a minimal factual showing
before they would grant or uphold a grant of a continuance under rule 56(f).
Emmons, 874 F.2d at 357; Fontenot, 780 F.2d at 1196; Paul Kadair, 694 F.2d at 1029;
Contemporary Mission, 648 F.2d at 107; Bryant, 671 F. Supp. at 1283.
117. 648 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1981).
118. Id. at 100.
119. Id. at 105.
120. Id. at 103, 105.
121. Id. at 105.
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plaintiff fails to produce any specific facts whatsoever to
support a conspiracy allegation, a district court may, in its
discretion, refuse to permit discovery and grant summary
judgment."
122
The costs of discovery can hardly be justified when the
party requesting additional time can produce no facts support-
ing his claim. In Emmons v. McLaughlin,'2' the plaintiff
brought several civil rights claims, alleging that he was the
subject of police harassment, but failed to provide any details
concerning the approximate dates, times, manner, location or
other circumstances surrounding the allegedly unconstitution-
al acts.124 The Sixth Circuit upheld a summary judgment for
the defendant, concluding "that it is not unfair to require a
party to show some factual basis for his claims of police
harassment before being permitted to conduct 'extensive'
discovery. " 25
To allow a party who has no factual support for her claim
to conduct further discovery under rule 56(f) would defeat the
purpose of the rule.'26 In Paul Kadair, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of
America,27 the plaintiff claimed that the defendant had
violated the antitrust laws by engaging in a conspiratorial
group boycott. 2  The plaintiff had no factual support for its
allegations, but sought the protection of rule 56(f) when the
defendant moved for summary judgment. 129  The district
court denied the plaintiffs rule 56(f) motion and granted
summary judgment to the defendant. 3 ° The Fifth Circuit
affirmed, quoting the district court's opinion:
"The intent of Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure is not to open the discovery net to allow a
fishing expedition. Instead, the rule is designed to
enable a party to seek particular facts relevant to an
already-established factual pattern of alleged anti-trust
122. Id. at 107.
123. 874 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1989).
124. Id. at 357.
125. Id.
126. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
127. 694 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1983).
128. Id. at 1020.
129. Id. at 1020-21.
130. Paul Kadair, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 88 F.R.D. 280, 289 (M.D. La. 1980),
affd, 694 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1983).
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activity. . . . It is clear that plaintiff has failed to set
forth a factual predicate to justify Rule 56(f) discov-
ery."
131
In the absence of such a factual predicate, the court cannot
justify expending its resources on costly discovery.
Extending discovery under rule 56(f) where a plaintiff has
no factual basis for his claim also may conflict with the goals
of rule 11.132 In Fontenot v. Upjohn Co.,133 the Fifth Cir-
cuit noted that "[t]o permit the pleadings themselves to carry
a case to trial when they rest only on the invention of counsel
would permit ultimate circumvention of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11." '4  The court suggested that permitting
speculative allegations to justify discovery would undermine
the spirit of rule 11. After all, the court concluded, if a party
has satisfied rule 11, "some evidentiary material should be
available to support each essential element of the claim."135
When a party argues that he should be granted a continu-
ance because he has no factual support for his claim, the court
should become suspicious. In Bryant v. O'Connor,136 the
plaintiff faced both a summary judgment motion and allega-
tions that he did not comply with rule 11.17 In response to
the summary judgment motion, the plaintiff filed a rule 56(f)
affidavit, arguing that he had insufficient facts to respond to
the motion for summary judgment. 138  In response to the
rule 11 charges, the plaintiff filed an affidavit alleging that he
had made a reasonable factual inquiry before filing his
complaint. The court noted that the rule 56(f) affidavit
suggested a violation of rule 11, while the rule 11 affidavit
suggested that the rule 56(f) affidavit lacked candor. Finding
this position untenable, the court denied the rule 56(f)
motion. 
139
131. Paul Kadair, 694 F.2d at 1029 (quoting Paul Kadair, 88 F.R.D. at 289).
132. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (requiring that all pleadings "of a party represented by
an attorney ... be signed by at least one attorney of record" and stating that the
signature certifies that the attorney, "after reasonable inquiry," believes that the
pleading "is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law").
133. 780 F.2d 1190 (5th Cir. 1986).
134. Id. at 1196.
135. Id.
136. 671 F. Supp. 1279 (D. Kan. 1986), affd, 848 F.2d 1064 (10th Cir. 1988).
137. Id. at 1283.
138. Id. at 1282.
139. Id. at 1283.
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Does Bryant mean that any rule 56(f) affidavit constitutes
an admission of a rule 11 violation? Of course not. A scenario
in which a party that has satisfied rule 11 could properly file
a rule 56(f) motion might go as follows. The plaintiff files her
complaint. The defendant supports a summary judgment
motion with affidavits. The plaintiff files her own affidavits
which explain both the factual foundation for her complaint
and the reasons why she cannot counter the defendant's
affidavits-most likely because essential information is in the
exclusive possession of the defendant. Under circumstances
like these, the plaintiff will have satisfied both rule 11 and
rule 56(f) and will be entitled to a continuance.
Some courts and commentators reject the idea that rule 11
considerations should affect the courts' decisions under rule
56(f). In Kamen v. AT&T,'4 ° the district court denied
plaintiffs rule 56(f) request for further discovery because it
believed that plaintiff had violated rule 11. The Second
Circuit reversed and held "that neither Rule 56 nor Rule 12(b)
was in any way modified by the adoption of the 1983 amend-
ments to Rule 11.""' Similarly, Judge Schwarzer, in an
article, contends that rule 11 does not bear on "the sufficiency
of a pleading to survive summary judgment after discovery"
but bears only on "its sufficiency for filing purposes."142 He
argues that a pleading might meet the rule 11 standard and
yet, after some discovery, fail to raise a genuine issue.
143
Rule 11 is intended to prevent abuse of the litigation process,
while rule 56 is intended to avoid unnecessary trials. They
therefore involve two entirely different issues and should
apply different standards.
44
140. 791 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1986).
141. Id. at 1011.
142. Schwarzer, Summary Judgment: A Proposed Revision of Rule 56, 110 F.R.D
213, 219-20 (1986).
143. Id. at 219.
144. Id. at 219-20. A recent note argues that because both rules are aimed at
reducing frivolous litigation, the same standard should be applied where the rules
overlap. See Note, A Genuine Ground in Summary Judgment for Rule 11, 99 YALE
L.J. 411 (1989) (authored by Beverly Dyer). Dyer suggests that the standard for
summary judgment should serve as a threshold requirement for rule 11 sanctions.
She contends that the use of summary judgment standards would reduce unwarrant-
ed rule 11 motions and improve fairness to litigants. Id. at 429-30. Conversely, this
Note argues that where a party violates rule 11 by filing a complaint without a
reasonable factual basis under the circumstances and then faces a properly supported
motion for summary judgment, he should not be able to avoid summary judgment by
requesting more time to establish a factual basis for his case through discovery.
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Rule 11 and rule 56 certainly involve different issues and
consequently apply different standards, but why should a
party that has not met the standard of rule 11 (reasonable
inquiry under the circumstances) be entitled to use judicial
resources for discovery? If a party can be punished for filing
a suit because he filed it without a sufficient factual inquiry,
why should he be allowed to add to that harm by conducting
needless discovery? Why should he be allowed to prolong
litigation he should not have brought in the first place? To
keep the rules working toward the same goals, rule 56(f)
should not be used to preserve a claim that is punishable
under rule 11. Therefore, if a party requests a continuance
under rule 56(f) and the court believes that the party violated
rule 11 in filing its complaint, the court should deny the
request and grant summary judgment.
III. A PROPOSAL TO REVISE RULE 56(F)
In its current form, rule 56(f) has generated confusion and
uncertainty. The result has been a tremendous amount of
litigation over a rule that should be straightforward. Because
the rule's language provides little guidance, judges are left on
their own to decide when rule 56(f) continuances are appropri-
ate. Resulting standards vary widely.145 A rule intended to
help the courts dispose of cases fairly and efficiently has
muddied further an already murky pool.
The uncertainty and ambiguity of the current rule 56(f)
undermine the basic purpose of summary judgment to promote
judicial economy. Ideally, summary judgment promotes
efficiency in two ways: first, by disposing of factually insuffi-
cient claims before trial;'46 and second, by narrowing the
scope of discovery and disposing of frivolous claims before
discovery.'47
The drafters of rule 56 may have considered disposing of
factually insufficient claims to be a primary goal at the time
the rule was drafted, but growing costs of discovery suggest
that summary judgment can improve efficiency the most by
145. See supra Part II.
146. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., New Am. Shipbuilders, Inc. v. United States, 871 F.2d 1077, 1081
(Fed. Cir. 1989); Catanzaro v. Masco Corp., 408 F. Supp. 862, 867 (D. Del. 1976).
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economizing at the discovery stage. 4 ' By failing to dispose
of frivolous claims before discovery is completed, the current
rule fails for two reasons. First, it permits courts to grant
continuances too liberally and does not force them to narrow
the scope of discovery during continuances. Second, the
uncertainty of the rule may discourage defendants from
bringing summary judgment motions before discovery is
completed. The preparation of summary judgment motions
consumes time and money. A defendant who faces a nearly
certain continuance of her motion may hesitate to bring it.
Such a "chilling effect" on early summary judgment motions
wastes resources by allowing meritless claims to live
on-sustained only by the uncertainty created by rule 56(f).
The current rule produces judicial inefficiency in a third,
unrelated way. Because of its vagueness, rule 56(f) itself has
spawned substantial litigation. Nearly every federal circuit
has construed rule 56(f) several times over the last few
years.'49 When a rule designed to reduce litigation gener-
ates this much confusion and conflict in the appellate courts,
it does not serve its purpose. Of all legal rules, those designed
to promote efficiency should be clearest in their language.
Recognizing the shortcomings of the current version of rule
56(f), the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference of the United States ("Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure") has suggested rewriting the rule
completely. In place of the current rule 56(f), it has proposed
the following:
OPPORTUNITY FOR DISCOVERY. No summary judgment
shall be rendered with respect to any claim, counter-
claim, cross-claim, or third party claim, nor shall any
fact be summarily established, until any opposing
parties have had a reasonable time to discover evidence
bearing on any fact sought to be established. 5 °
Although this proposal may remedy some of the uncertainty of
the current rule, it cures too much. By eliminating judicial
discretion, it requires courts to deny a properly supported
148. See supra notes 27-28.
149. See supra notes 79, 82, 86-112.
150. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) (proposed June 12, 1989), reprinted in 110 S. Ct. at
CXCIX.
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motion for summary judgment where a party opposing the
motion shows that he has not had a "reasonable time to
discover evidence bearing on any fact sought to be estab-
lished." Under this rule, a party might be able to resist a
properly supported motion for summary judgment without
showing that he has a factual basis for his claim or that
discovery is likely to raise a genuine issue.
It should not take much to make these showings. A sworn
affidavit demonstrating some factual basis for the claim,
explaining why the party cannot defend against the motion at
the present time, and stating why further discovery is reason-
ably likely to produce facts that will create a genuine issue
would suffice. These showings are necessary for summary
judgment to achieve its purpose of promoting judicial economy
by winnowing out frivolous claims before substantial resources
are expended on discovery. Under the proposed rule, however,
a party opposing a motion may be able to avoid summary
judgment without making any of these showings.
Furthermore, the proposed rule does not really resolve the
ambiguity of the current rule. First, it is unclear what the
phrase, "evidence bearing on any fact sought to be established"
means. Does this language refer to evidence that is likely to
raise a genuine issue? Or does it refer to any evidence related
to a factual issue in the case? Second, it assumes that "a
reasonable time to discover" can be determined by fairly
uniform principles from case to case. In practice, however,
courts will have wide discretion on this issue, because the
number of factors that affect the reasonableness of the time
taken to conduct discovery is so large. Because the proposed
rule provides no guidance on what factors to consider in
determining reasonableness, courts will be left with tremen-
dous amount of leeway in making such determinations.
To avoid the problems and ambiguities with both the
current rule and the recent proposal, I suggest the following
revision of rule 56(f):
(f) When Affidavits are Unavailable. Where a party
opposing the motion can, by affidavit or adequate
equivalent, establish a factual predicate for the
party's claim, show that further discovery is
reasonably likely to produce specific facts suffi-
FALL 1990] 283
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cient to create a genuine issue of material fact,
and explain why the party is unable to produce
those facts at this time, the court shall continue
the motion on such terms as it deems appropriate
and permit the party to conduct discovery [that is]
material to the disposition of the motion. 5 '
Although this rule may require greater efforts from a party
seeking a continuance than the current rule, it also gives
greater rewards to the party who satisfies the requirements.
It demands more by requiring specific showings where the
present rule requires only general "reasons" why "the party
cannot . . . present . . .facts essential to justify the party's
opposition."'52 It rewards the party, however, by making the
continuance mandatory-if the party seeking it makes the
necessary showing-while under the present rule the continu-
ance is merely discretionary.
The revision suggested by this Note will bring more
certainty to the procedure to obtain continuances in a number
of ways. First, it specifies exactly what a party desiring a
continuance must show. These requirements should be spelled
out even further in the advisory committee's notes. These
notes, for example, should explain what is meant by "factual
predicate," "reasonably likely to produce specific facts
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact," and
"explain why the party is unable to produce those facts at this
time."
"Factual predicate" should be defined as a showing suffi-
cient to satisfy the requirements of rule 11. The notes should
also point out what is necessary to establish a reasonable
likelihood of creating a genuine issue. To satisfy this require-
151. The italicized part of this revision uses language suggested by Schwarzer,
supra note 142, at 214. Judge Schwarzer's entire proposed revision is as follows: "(e)
Discovery. When the court finds that additional discovery may be necessary to
enable a party to oppose a motion, it shall continue the motion on such terms as it
deems appropriate and permit the party to conduct discovery material to the
disposition of the motion." This proposal suffers from the same problems as the
revision suggested by the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure because it
fails to give either the court or the parties any guidance about what circumstances
will render additional discovery necessary. It does, however, have the salutary effect
of directing the court to limit discovery under a summary judgment continuance to
issues material to the disposition of the motion.
152. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f).
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ment, a party should have to show a plausible basis for her
belief that the facts exist and a realistic prospect that further
discovery will produce them. Finally, the notes should
indicate ways that a party can explain satisfactorily her
inability to produce the facts at the time of the motion.
Exclusive possession of the facts by the opposing party should
be chief among these. Although this proposal allows room for
interpretation of these requirements, the requirements them-
selves are certain.
Second, the revision suggested by this Note specifically
allows a party to make the required showings based on
adequate equivalents to affidavits. Although many courts
have interpreted the affidavit requirement of the current rule
loosely, this proposal negates those decisions that have
demanded strict compliance with the affidavit requirement.
The proposal also negates extremely loose interpretations of
the rule by requiring adequate equivalents to affidavits. The
advisory committee notes should define "adequate equivalent"
as a written proffer filed with the court and made in a timely
and authoritative manner that subjects the maker to sanctions
if made in bad faith.
Third, this proposal greatly limits judicial discretion in the
granting of continuances. If a party makes the proper show-
ings, the judge must grant a continuance. Although efficiency
is the primary purpose of the summary judgment procedure,
fairness should not be sacrificed. If a party can make the
required showings, she has established that she has reason-
able grounds to believe that her claim is supported by the
facts. She has also demonstrated that further discovery is
likely to raise a genuine issue for trial. The primary purpose
of rule 56(f) is to prevent the premature dismissal of potential-
ly valid claims. Therefore, if a party can make the showings,
she should be entitled to a continuance and should not be
subject to the discretion of an individual judge.
Finally, the revision specifically directs the judge, if a
continuance is in order, to permit only discovery that is
material to the disposition of the motion. This requirement
will ensure that continuances serve their purposes of narrow-
ing the scope of discovery and promoting efficiency by prevent-
ing judges from allowing general discovery after a party has
made a properly supported motion for summary judgment.
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IV. THE PROPOSAL ILLUSTRATED
The following hypothetical 153 will highlight the problems
of the current rule and the proposal of the Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure. It also will illustrate how my
suggested revision would alleviate those problems.
Assume that a state government files suit in federal district
court against the owner of a parcel of land charging violations
of state and federal law for contaminating the groundwater
with volatile organic compounds (VOCs). The defendant
responds by suing all of his neighbors as third-party defen-
dants. An essential element of the contamination claims is
discharge by the owner or one of his agents of VOCs onto the
property.
One of the neighbors moves for summary judgment before
discovery and files two affidavits. The first is signed by the
neighbor, who owns the property and the business located on
it. He swears that he purchased the undeveloped property
and built a furniture warehouse on it, which he has operated
continuously since its construction. He further swears that
his business has never used and never had occasion to use
VOCs and that to the best of his knowledge VOCs have never
been discharged onto his property.
The second affidavit is by a state geologist who has studied
the groundwater beneath the relevant properties. He swears
that the groundwater under the third-party defendant's
property is not contaminated by VOCs, that the third-party
defendant's property is down-gradient from the defendant's,
and that in his professional opinion it is impossible that any
of the contamination under the defendant's property originated
on the third-party defendant's property." 4
153. This hypothetical is a variation on a hypothetical discussed in a class on
federal environmental law. I devised it to demonstrate a fact pattern in which there
is some incentive to use the discovery and summary judgment rules to prolong
frivolous litigation.
154. Opinion testimony is generally not an appropriate basis for summary
judgment because it is always subject to evaluation by the fact finder. See Webster
v. Offshore Food Serv., Inc., 434 F.2d 1191 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 823
(1971); see also 10A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 21, § 2738, at 502-
04 (1983) ('However, if the only issue is one of the kind on which expert testimony
must be presented, and nothing is presented to challenge the affidavit of the expert,
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The defendant files no affidavits in response and rests on
his pleadings. Under the standard of Celotex,'55 the
third-party defendant is entitled to summary judgment
because a reasonable jury could only find for the third-party
defendant. The defendant responds by moving for a rule 56(f)
continuance to conduct discovery of the third-party defendant.
The defendant's attorney files an affidavit with this motion
asserting only that answers to interrogatories and discovery
of third-party defendant's records are necessary to respond to
the motion.
Under the current version of rule 56(f), the decision on this
motion would be within the discretion of the judge. The judge
could grant the motion for one of two reasons. First, she could
decide that summary judgment is improper before the initia-
tion of discovery. Second, she could hold that summary
judgment is inappropriate because discovery might possibly
reveal a discharge of VOCs by the third-party defendant.
Under the proposal of the Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure, the judge would probably be even more likely
to grant the continuance. The proposal provides that summa-
ry judgment shall not be entered "until any opposing parties
have had a reasonable time to discover."15' Because in this
case the defendant has had no opportunity to conduct discov-
ery, few courts would avoid the clear directive of the rule and
grant summary judgment at this stage.
Under the rule proposed by this Note, the court would
almost certainly have to grant summary judgment. The
defendant has done nothing to show that he filed this claim in
good faith. He has offered no factual support for his claim and
has made no effort to show that discovery is reasonably likely
to create a genuine issue of fact. He has not proffered the
affidavit of an expert saying that it is at least possible that the
contamination came from the third-party defendant's property.
His claim rests solely on the physical proximity of the
third-party defendant's property and the possibility that
discovery will uncover facts sufficient to create an issue.
Should this case proceed to discovery? All of the evidence
suggests that the third-party defendant is not responsible for
the VOCs in the defendant's ground water. The defendant can
summary judgment may be proper.").
155. See supra notes 43-52 and accompanying text.
156. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) (proposed June 12, 1989), reprinted in 110 S. Ct. at
CXCIC.
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offer no plausible reason why discovery would change this
state of affairs. Moreover, this case has all the signs of a
frivolous suit. The defendant's shotgun strategy of suing
everyone who might possibly be connected to the contamina-
tion suggests that defendant is simply trying to bully anyone
he can into contributing to a settlement. The possibility of
protracted litigation with its attendant costs might convince
his neighbors to contribute to the settlement pot, reducing the
defendant's financial burden.
This is precisely the type of behavior that the Federal Rules
should prevent and discourage. The current rules as well as
the recent proposal by the Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure do not accomplish this purpose. When a party
knows that she will have to demonstrate some factual basis for
her claim even before discovery begins, she will think twice
about suing in the hopes that she can use the costs of discov-
ery and the potential of huge damages to coerce a settlement.
Until the Federal Rules provide the courts with a mechanism
to throw out factually baseless claims early in the game, the
system will continue to be plagued by frivolous suits that
consume time and resources that should be devoted to
meritorious claims. The revision of rule 56(f) proposed by this
Note would be a step in the right direction. By requiring a
party seeking a continuance to show that her claim has some
factual basis and that further discovery is reasonably likely to
raise a genuine issue, this proposal will further the goal of the
Federal Rules that all claims be resolved as expeditiously as
fairness will allow.
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